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Whither the Japanese Model?:  





Amidst a prolonged recession and financial crisis during the past ten years, Japan’s capitalism has 
undergone change. In what direction is it moving? Is Japan converging on the US model? Or will it 
maintain distinctive national characteristics? This paper argues that no single clear pattern has 
emerged with regard to the future of the Japanese model. Rather, Japanese firms have responded to the 
challenges differently over the past years. Four systems of governance have emerged. First, the 
traditional Japanese type of corporate governance, a relationship-based, insider-oriented form, 
remains in place. Second, very few are adopting a US-style, market-oriented corporate governance. 
Meanwhile, two emergent ‘hybrid’ forms mix market/outsider-oriented elements with relational/ 
insider-oriented characteristics. This means that Japan is demonstrating an increasing diversity of 
mechanisms of governance that prefigure “many Japans.”  
 






In the roughly three decades after the defeat of war, Japan made a distinctive capitalist 
economy, governed by nationally specific social and political institutions that made for high 
international competitiveness and at the same time low inequality of incomes and living 
standards. By the late 1980s when the differences in performance and governing institutions 
between the Japanese economy and other competitors such as USA came to be widely noted, 
few doubted the continued viability of the “Japanese model” as the most successful of the 
major economies. Shortly thereafter, “the Bubble” burst in 1991. Japan went into a 
prolonged economic recession (the so-called “lost ten years”). Suddenly, many experts, 
government officials, business executives and opinion leaders questioned the very 
institutions that had been credited with Japan’s economic miracle.  
Reform advocates concluded that government and industry would have to fundamentally 
change their ways. They emphasized deregulation and other structural reforms (kōzō 
kaikaku) such as corporate governance reforms. Japanese government and industry leaders 
responded. The government downsized and reorganized itself, injected tax payer’s money 
into ailing banks, liberalized financial markets, eased labor standards, revised corporate laws, 
privatized public corporations, and revised pension systems. Likewise, firms sold off 
subsidiaries, merged with past rivals, switched supply sources, shifted financing methods, 
introduced new wage systems, and reorganized their board of directors. All in all, during the 
past ten years since the banking crisis of 1997, the same year when the financial crisis swept 
Asia, the Japanese government and industry have transformed their institutions and practices. 
Then, the questions are in order: Is the Japanese model really changing? In what direction is 
it moving? Is Japan converging on the US model? Or will it maintain distinctive national 
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characteristics? Can Japan be a ‘thought leader’ of East Asian countries that are searching for 
an appropriate post-crisis model of capitalism?1 
The existing literature either emphasizes the inevitability of Japan’s neoliberal 
convergence (Dore 2000; Hansmann and Kraakman 2004), or stresses the rigidities of its 
institutional structures that resist change (Lincoln 2001; Anchordoguy 2005; Vogel 2006). 
Beyond this customary dichotomy embedded in the literature, this paper argues that no single 
clear pattern has emerged with regard to the future of the Japanese model. Rather, the 
Japanese government and industry have responded to the challenges differently over the past 
years. The result has been an increasing diversity of mechanisms of governance that 
prefigure “many Japans.” Diverse forms of mechanisms that govern industries coexist within 
the Japanese economy. Ultimately, this work suggests a type of meta-governance that 
accommodates organizational diversity.  
Empirically this paper examines how various elements of corporate governance have 
changed. Corporate governance is often defined narrowly in terms of agency problems 
between owners and managers within a firm. Instead, this paper takes a broader view of it as 
involving relations among multiple stakeholders, such as shareholders, managers, employees, 
unions, banks, government bureaucracy, and political leaders. It is viewed as being 
embedded within various rules and norms that shape how these stakeholders interact in 
corporate decision-making. Here, corporate governance is about power and responsibility 
located within institutional contexts such as the financial system, corporate law, industrial 
relations, or the regime of political economy where the elements of politics are in play 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 1-2). Patterns in corporate governance vary substantially with 
the broader institutional structures of a given capitalism. In this sense, Japanese corporate 
governance lies at the core of the Japanese model. Much of what has happened is driven by it 
(Aoki 2001; Dore 1997, 2000).  
The next section begins by briefly introducing the theoretical underpinnings of this paper. 
It builds on insights from institutional theories such as ‘Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)’ 
school (Hall and Soskice 2001). Section 3 sketches the main characteristics of the Japanese 
model, with analytical focus placed on corporate mechanisms of governance. Section 4 
discusses the economic and political forces promoting reform. Section 5 interprets the 
emerging patterns of diversity and institutional change in post-crisis Japan. Largely four 
distinct patterns of corporate governance are present. The conclusion provides some 
suggestions for governing diverse mechanisms of governance and implications for the future 
of East Asian capitalism. 
   
 
2. DIVERSITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
There is no single form of capitalism. Capitalisms diverge (Albert 1991; Whitely 1992, 
1999; Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Whitley and Kristensen 1996, 1999; Boyer 1996; Berger 
and Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Kitschelt et al. 
                                                          
1  This word is used by Aso Taro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan in his speech (12/06).  
“Thought leader is one who through fate is forced to face up against some sort of very difficult issue 
earlier than others. And because the issue is so challenging, it is difficult to solve. But as the person 
struggles to somehow resolve the issue, he/she becomes something for others to emulate.” 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0512.html 




1999; Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice 2000; Quack et al. 2000; Dore 2000; DiMaggio 2001; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003; and Yamamura and Streeck 2003; Morgan, Whitely 
and Moon 2005). Institutionalist approaches such as regulation and VoC suggest that market 
forces are merely one factor contributing to capitalist reproduction. Adherents reject the key 
assumption of neoclassical economics that there is a clearly delimited, socially disembedded 
sphere of economic action that is driven by the economizing behavior of inherently rational 
individuals who have a stable order of preferences. Instead they are concerned with the 
socially embedded nature of capitalist institutions (Granovetter 1985). Just as societies are 
diverse according to a diverse mix of rules, laws and norms, so are types of capitalisms. 
Capitalism, as a set of institutions that pattern human relationships to persist or reproduce 
over time, has diverse forms of mechanisms of governance by which organizations are 
coordinated and institutions are maintained and reproduced. Hall and Soskice (2001), leading 
VoC approach, divides various capitalisms into two categories. One is a liberal market 
economy (LME) identified with neoliberal policies, labor markets setting wages through 
competition, corporate financing through capital markets, and Anglo-American countries. 
The other is a coordinated market economy (CME), where social and political institutions 
engage directly in shaping economic action. Labor markets are strongly regulated and 
corporate financing is made through long-term relationship with banks. This form is linked 
to social democracy and non-Anglo American countries.   
This dichotomy may suppress the important diversity within the CME category. Hall and 
Soskice respond to this criticism by accounting for ‘second-order’ differences among CMEs. 
For example, many of the northern European cases demonstrate industry-based coordination 
while in Japan and Korea, group-based coordination prevail. In the former, coordination 
depends on business associations and labor unions that are organized primarily along sectoral 
lines. By contrast, coordination in the latter builds on keiretsu, or families of companies, with 
dense interconnections cutting across sectors. Hall and Soskice also note that France is a case 
that does not correspond to the ideal types of either LME or CME (Hall and Soskice: 34-6).  
Hall and Soskice extend their works further by making a claim that a particular set of 
institutional structures provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific type of 
activities (2001: 37-9). In CME, firms make more extensive use of non-market modes of 
coordination to organize their activities, while in LME, firms rely mainly on markets to 
coordinate their activities. The former is better at supporting incremental innovation, while 
the latter is highly supportive of radical innovation. The finding is that Japan specializes in 
technological developments that are just the reverse of those in USA. Yamamura (2003) 
argues that the US model performs better during periods when technology is changing 
fundamentally and rapidly while the Japanese model performs better during periods when 
technology is evolving slowly. Likewise, Anchordoguy (2005) explains why communitarian 
Japan as a CME variant finds great difficulty in promoting IT industries. 
This brings us to an important point on institutional change. In VoC, typologies are fixed 
over time; institutions persist. This is particularly so because institutional complementarities 
work in each form. Complementarities exist where components of a whole mutually 
compensate for or reinforce each other. VoC either anticipates that strong complementarities 
among institutions within a capitalist form generate disincentives and substantial barriers to 
radical change. Or, it anticipates that complementarities may entail change in one institution 
creating momentum for changes in other institutions, leading to radical change (63-4).  
Both ways of anticipation lead us to another aspect of dichotomy in terms of change: 
stability vs. radical change. A Concept of this kind is consistent with the conventional path of 
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dependence literature. Thelen is critical on this point, however. She points out that there is a 
wide variety of modes of institutional change among which is an evolutionary, incremental 
one (Thelen 2004, 2005). Given a varied patchwork of a set of polar contrasts, there is no 
room for “hybrid” forms to be recognized as a viable option. Hybridization, as opposed to 
simple imitation of the exogenous model as well as status quo, is the usual outcome of 
attempts at borrowing institutions and practices. Mixing of institutional forms is quite 
common in practice (Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000).  
The second point is in order. Several distinctive mechanisms accounted for by VoC, such 
as sunk costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and institutional complementarities, all 
operate at the national level. Most typologies of capitalist diversity are based on the nation-
state, or the national economy. This is not because of any inherent tendency of institutional 
analysis to the nation-state, nor because of normative preference on the part of theorists for 
markets to be intervened by the state. It is the belief that twentieth-century capitalism was 
organized and regulated by the state (Crouch and Streeck 1997: 2). According to Aoki, 
diversity among skill formations occurs at an inter-national rather than inter-industry level. 
“There is a tendency for a single organization mode to prevail and become established as a 
convention within each economy (2000: 46).” In sum, the VoC literature takes the centrality 
of the nation-state in shaping the modes of governance for granted (Crouch 2005: 41). 
The nation-state cannot always be treated as a unit of the same phenomenon, however. 
Some empirical findings follow. Dualism persists in the German model. Herrigel (1996) 
demonstrates that two distinct mechanisms of governance (decentralized versus autarkic 
industrial governance), located in different regions, have characterized the modern German 
experience. The two-Japan thesis, one made up of highly competitive export sectors and the 
other comprised of inefficient protected sectors, also demonstrates weakness of a national-
level analysis (Katz 1998). VoC works should be clear about the distinction: arguments 
about the characteristics of national economy limited to specific sectors, or claims about 
those to apply to all.  
In sum, in order to better understand capitalist diversity and particularly institutional 
change under systemic stress, we need to deconstruct the taken-for-granted prevalent 
conceptions of institutional change. Central to the account of this paper are these two 
conceptions. First, change can occur in diverse ways, including a hybrid way. Second, 
diverse institutional forms can coexist in a national economy.  
 
     
3. JAPANESE SYSTEM UNDER PRESSURE 
 
3.1. Traditional Model  
 
During the high-speed growth period, a Japanese-style corporate governance system 
emerged. It is characterized as twofold: one is an external side of governance that is shaped 
by inter-firm relations such as bank-firm relationship. The other is an internal side of 
governance that is characterized by intra-firm relations among the management, owners and 
employees.  
The traditional Japanese financial system is best characterized by its bank-centered 
system. Capital markets were underdeveloped. Firms relied on bank loans. Under this 
condition, firms tended to have a stable, tight relationship with a specific bank. In Aoki and 
Patrick’s term, it is a “main bank” relationship, “a more or less informal set of regular 




practices, institutional arrangements, and behavior that constitute a system of corporate 
finance and governance.” (Aoki and Patrick 1994: xxi) The main bank establishes a cross-
shareholding relationship with a firm, provides loans, provides the majority of its other 
banking needs, and acts as a leader within a group of institutions that provides funding. 
Further, it monitors the client firm and intervenes when the it runs into financial difficulty. It 
is expected to organize a work out to save (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharftein 1991; Sheard 
1994).  
Japanese firms not only held cross-shareholding with banks, but also with other industrial 
firms. These horizontal groupings form dense and stable networks based on long-term 
relationships (Gerlach 1992). The ownership ties often overlap with various other 
cooperative business relationships within corporate groups (keiretsu). The vertically 
structured keiretsu such as the famous subcontracting relationships in the automobile 
industry also belong to this category. Here, stable shareholders protect firms from hostile 
takeovers and short-term stock market pressures. This enables firms to pursue a long-term 
management perspective, a characteristic feature of Japanese firm.  
In what is called stakeholder capitalism (Dore 2000), the interests of employees play an 
important role. The primary concern of top managers is the long-term prosperity of the firm 
and welfare of members. Profits are secondary. In this firm, long-term employment is the 
norm. It is supported by strong legal constraints on dismissals, and equally by seniority-
based wages and rank-hierarchy system of promotion.  
The board of directors is an extension of internal promotion. Board members consist 
almost entirely of internally promoted employees. As such, the president and top managers 
are seen as the elders of enterprise community (Dore 2000). The statutory auditor has 
become an honorary position bestowed to former high-ranked managers.  
In summary, Japanese corporate governance includes a number of interrelated institutions. 
Japanese firms are governed by insiders. The market for corporate control does not work. An 
Insider-oriented board is sustained by a particular labor relations system such as long-term 
employment and seniority-base wages which, in turn, enables firms to invest in firm-specific 
skills, being the source of distinct comparative advantages for incremental innovation in the 
manufacturing sector. Insider governance is supplemented by ‘contingent governance’ by the 
main bank as well as stable ownership ensured by cross-shareholding with keiretsu firms. 
Ultimately, the state monitors the main bank, promotes industry, and ultimately provides the 
contexts by which all the institutions subsist and reproduce. 
Japan has achieved astonishing economic growth, at an average annual rate of 9.3 percent 
in 1956-1973 and 4.1 percent in 1975-1991. Between 1956 and 1973 Japan quadrupled its 
gross domestic product per worker. It became the second largest economy in the world. By 
the time the Cold War ended, Japan was heralded as the real winner. The bursting of the 
bubble, however, was a big turnaround. The subsequent, prolonged economic recession has 
driven change in corporate mechanisms of governance.   
 
3.2. Globalization and liberalization of Money and Finance   
 
Financial deregulation in Japan was a gradual process beginning in the late 1970s and 
culminating in the so-called “Big Bang” of 1997. The state deregulated the secondary 
markets for government bonds, followed by the 1980 revision of the Foreign Exchange Law, 
which opened the door for cross-border finance. Just as profitable Japanese firms, mostly 
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export sector firms, could finance their projects from overseas, so did the state allow firms to 
issue bonds and equity domestically at market prices in order to compete (Table 1).2  
With new opportunities, large firms, in particular, reduced their reliance on bank loans 
and diversified their financial resources. The ratio of equity finance (i.e., equity, convertible 
bond, warrant bond) to total corporate finance increased dramatically. The average of the 
total amount of bonds issued from 1985 to 1989 increased by more than 140 percent from 
ones issued between 1980 and 1984. By contrast, during the same period, bank borrowing 
declined dramatically. The share of bank loans declined by about 10 percent points from the 
late 1970s to 1990. Although the amount of debt capital raised had declined in the 1990s 
because of the prolonged recession, bond issuance did not decline as drastically as bank 
borrowing (Table 2).  
As mentioned earlier, main banks had played a disciplinary role in the Japanese financial 
system. With the decline in bank financing, main banks faced challenges. Those who left 
banks were good clients, equipped with a wide range of debt choices. This led banks to find 
new clients in order to fill the gap. Adverse selection was caused. Banks found risky firms, 
such as firms in construction, real estate, and non-banks (Hoshi 2001).3 The bubble economy 
                                                          
2 Japanese firms could finance in the Euromarket and Japanese financial institutions opened branches 
overseas. They became a major player in the Euromarket, which allowed them to circumvent domestic 
restrictions. Since this market did not require collateral, firms could lower the cost of bond issues. One 
study shows that eurobond issuance costs were less than one-tenth those of a domestic bond in the 
early 1980s.Matsuo Junsuke, Nihon no shasai shijo (Toyokeizai shimbunsha 1999), p. 81. 
3 It is misleading that financial liberalization led to banks’ lending to risky projects. Hoshi and Kashyap 
(2001) point out that 1980’s financial liberalization unevenly affected firms, households and banks. 
While it broadened the range of choice for firms to finance, the options for households (savers) and 
the range of services that banks could provide did not expand simultaneously. Due to a slow pace of 
deregulation in the compartmentalized financial system, banks could not successfully pursue a 
universal banking strategy by broadening the range of services while household assets were held in 
bank deposits. This uneven development induced banks to risky projects which caused the bubble, 
leading to financial crisis in the 1990s. See also Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap, “The Japanese 







 collapsed, followed by long stagnation. By 1997, Japanese banks accumulated a huge 
amount of non-performing loans (NPL) mostly from those risky industries and losses on 
stock purchased at the height of the Bubble. At its peak in 2002, the total NPLs of major 
banks stood at 28.4 trillion yen.    
As Japan went into the banking crisis, bank’s governing role vis-à-vis firms was greatly 
affected. Banks not only lost good and sizeable clients, but were less effective in governing 
the relationships with their remaining firms.4 Loans to financially distressed firms were 
rolled over and undermined the credible threat of bank intervention. Eventually the financial 
crisis led banks to sell cross-share holdings in order to improve their balance sheets. This 
yielded a large divestment of banks from stable shareholdings in client firms -- particularly  
Source: Hoshi and Kashap (2001), 244. 
 
 
firms with good valuation.  
 
3.3. Capital market pressure   
 
By the mid 1990s, Japan had began to face strong pressure from global capital markets. 
This came with the troubles in the banking sector which suffered from huge NPLs piled up 
after the bubble burst. In 1995, two credit unions and a regional bank failed. The difficulties 
that faced housing loan companies (jusen) became a hot political issue. A heated discussion 
of how to bail out Jusen and other ailing financial institutions made it clear that even healthy 
banks would suffer if they bore the costs of bailing out ailing institutions under the convoy 
system.  
Domestic problems were immediately transmitted into the global markets in the form of 
the so-called “Japan Premium.” Stock prices of banks declined while rating agencies such as 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgraded the rates of the banks. The main banks that 
were rated AA or higher during the early 1990s dropped to A and BBB by 1996. The 
banking crisis of 1997 ― the fall of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the collapse of 
Yamaichi Securities and the spread of the Asian Financial Crisis ― all led to a furthering 
drop in bank stock prices, downgraded credit ratings, and increased Japan Premium.  
Meanwhile, the steady decline of stock prices attracted foreign investors who now valued 
Japanese stocks as cheap relative to others in the global market. Foreign portfolio investment 
increased dramatically. In 2005, foreigners owned 23.7% of the stocks listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE). Table 3 illustrates that the share of institutional investors in firms 
representing Japan is over 50 percent, and that of foreign investors in those firms is over 30 
percent. Likewise, stock market turnover increased dramatically from 27% in 1992 to a 
                                                          
Banking Crisis.” In Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotenberg eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1999. 
4 Hoshi and Kashyap conclude that the combination of lower borrowing and less board representation 
reduced bank’s bargaining power with firms and the ability of banks to play an important role in 
corporate governance. Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan (Oxford 
2001), p. 257. 
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historically high level of 108.8% in 2005 (Jackson and Miyajima 2007). The sharp increase 
in foreign share and market turnover disrupted stable shareholding patterns among firms and 
banks.  
 
3.4. External Governance Change   
 
Liberalization and globalization of finance, the rise of capital market pressure and, most 
of all, the long economic recession culminating in the banking crisis caused substantial 
changes in corporate mechanisms of governance in Japan. Yet changes are uneven across 
different institutions of corporate governance. Financial globalization and liberalization 
dramatically changed the bank-centered financial system in Japan. As corporate financing 
has diverged into two (bank-financing firms and bond-financing firms), bank-financing firms 
have maintained the main bank system whereas bond-financing firms have been left out. In 
particular, large-scale firms lessened ties with banks while small-scale firms continued 
borrowing from banks (Miyajima and Arikawa 2004). It is followed by the diminishing role 
Table 3. Foreign Share in Key Japanese Firms 
Institutional Investor Foreign Investor 
Rank Company 
1974 1990 1999 1974 1990 1999 
1 Canon 29.4 41.6 60.4 3.7 15.5 40.7 
2 Hoya 16.5 28.7 58.1 7.8 5.0 29.9 
3 Yamanouchi Seiyaku 27.7 41.1 57.5 2.0 18.8 38.3 
4 Rom - 11.1 56.2 - 6.0 42.9 
5 Murata 16.4 30.8 55.5 0.1 14.9 36.0 
6 Furukawa Denki 13.6 24.7 54.0 0.1 5.0 37.0 
7 Sony 41.3 29.5 53.3 38.0 18.8 44.6 
8 Takeda Yakuhin 25.3 32.9 53.3 3.4 6.0 27.7 
9 Fuji Film 33.9 29.7 53.1 14.8 9.7 35.6 
10 TDK 15.1 35.7 51.9 1.1 12.1 36.8 
11 Yokyokawa Denki 44.2 52.9 51.3 1.3 9.7 18.6 
12 Mitsumi Denki 7.2 18.6 50.8 7.2 3.7 28.3 
13 Sumitomo Denki 31.5 44.2 50.8 6.2 14.9 25.1 
14 Pioneer 17.1 34.7 50.3 5.7 12.7 36.5 
15 KOA 19.5 30.0 50.2 0.3 0.9 30.4 
16 Sanko 18.9 37.4 50.1 1.3 15.2 30.1 
17 Shionogi 30.8 30.1 50.1 2.1 2.6 31.2 
18 Kurata 5.6 34.2 50.0 3.6 8.6 36.3 
19 Crare 16.4 41.7 50.0 0.0 11.0 24.3 
20 Shinkoshi 15.9 35.4 49.7 0.1 11.0 25.8 
  (Data calculated from Tokyo keizai shinbunsha, Kigyo keiretsu soran, Nikkei NEEDS) 




of banks with regard to corporate governance in large-scale firms. Likewise, the corporate 
governance role of banks vis-à-vis small or financially distressed client firms diminished. 
Banks facing financial distress engaged in soft-budgeting and followed and “evergreen” 
policy of rolling over loans to distressed firms (Jackson and Miyajima 2007, 19). In this case, 
banks serve as the main provider of loans, but not as disciplinarian (= traditional main 
banker) to firms.    
Given the power of foreign institutional investors dramatically increased in TSE, 
investment targets are invariably the firms with a high reputation in the capital markets (high 
ranks by international credit rating agencies) and high ROE. This means that foreigners 
invest in firms that are mostly large-scale, low leveraged, highly profitable (or high expected 
return) and given full access to the bond markets. The foreign investors put pressure on those 
firms in the way that firms pursue transparent and ROE-centered business management. In 
doing so, foreigners affect corporate governance by participating on boards of directors.  
The weakening of the main bank relationship coupled with increased foreign portfolio 
investment is an important element of the declining ownership stabilized by cross-
shareholding. In the 2006 Economic and Financial White Paper, the percentage of cross-
shareholding declined from 20% in early 1990s to 7.6% in 2003. The percentage of stable 
ownership also decreased from 40% to 24% in the same period (Cabinet 2006, 174). Again, 
dualism emerges. Profitable firm with easy access to capital markets and high foreign 
ownership reduced their relationship with banks and sought to improve their market 
valuation by dissolving cross-shareholdings with less profitable firms. Together, distressed 
banks had to sell high-priced stock shares in order to improve their balance sheets. By 
contrast, less profitable firms with difficulty in accessing capital markets and less foreign 
investment maintained bank relationships and cross-shareholding (Miyajima and Kuroki 
2007).  
 
3.5. Internal Governance Change  
 
Despite substantial changes in many elements of Japanese corporate governance, long-
term employment practices persist. The 2003 METI survey shows that over 80% of firms 
continue their commitment to long-term employment. In the 2006 Economic and Financial 
White Paper, the same commitment increased to 90% (Cabinet 2006, 180). But firms no 
longer maintain seniority-based pay. They have introduced either a merit-based payment 
system or more complex types of payment systems that combines seniority and merit. And 
yet, insider governance faced reform. Board reform is the case in point. While introducing 
independent outside directors is the core of reform, Japanese firms are given options. Some 
introduced the American-style board of director, others stick with the traditional Japanese-
style, and still others introduced the executive officer system (shikko-yakuin sei), a hybrid 
form.  
Given these institutional changes, Japanese firms demonstrate a continued commitment 
to the so-called “Japanese-style management (Nihon-kata keiei)” characterized as 
emphasizing employee-oriented and market share-oriented (as opposed to shareholder-
oriented, ROE-oriented) management (Ibid., 182). Further, the survey by the Cabinet found a 
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3.6. Diversity in Governance 
 
Japanese corporate mechanisms of governance are not moving in a uniform way. 
Theories of convergence point to growing international capital mobility and competitive 
pressure to generate shareholder-oriented governance. The US model plays a hegemonic role 
in this sense (Dore 2000). The findings of recent research suggest otherwise. During the past 
decade, Japan has transformed itself substantially. It has clearly moved toward a more 
market-oriented, American model of governance. Nonetheless, very large differences remain 
firm. Not all industries and firms are equally exposed to pressures for change. Nor are their 
responses to those pressures. There emerges an important diversity of corporate governance 
in contemporary Japan.  
The emergent diverse forms of corporate governance can be categorized into four types 
by using two indicators: external governance structures (financial and ownership 
characteristics) and internal governance structures (board and employment characteristics). 
In terms of the former, there are market-oriented (e.g., bond finance and institutional 
investors) and relational (e.g., bank financing and cross-shareholding) patterns. In terms of 
the latter, there are outsider/market-oriented (e.g., outsider boards, high disclosure, no long-
term employment, merit pay, and use of stock option) and insider/relational (e.g., insider 
board and private information, long-term employment, seniority pay, and no stock option) 
patterns.  
Looking at Figure 1, four types of corporate governance are established. The upper left-
hand corner(A) represents the traditional Japanese type of corporate governance with 
relational patterns of external governance such as bank finance and cross-shareholding 
(stable ownership), coupled with relational patterns of internal governance such as insider 
 
 
Figure 1. Emergent patterns of corporate governance in Japan 






































boards and long-term employment. The lower right-hand corner (D) approximates US-style 
corporate governance (Anglo-American type) with market finance, high shareholder 
influence, outsider boards, and market employment patterns. Meanwhile, the two ‘hybrid’ 
forms mix market/outsider-oriented elements with relational/insider-oriented characteristics. 
The lower left-hand corner (B) has market finance and strong foreign and institutional 
ownership, but retains relational elements of employment and to a lesser degree some 
characteristics of insider boards (higher transparency but fewer independent outsiders, 
establishing ‘executive officer’). Finally, the upper right-hand corner (C) is another hybrid 
form that shows relational finance and cross-shareholding combined with market-oriented 
board and employment pattern.  
The recent work by Jackson and Miyajima (2007) suggests that while A-type of corporate 
governance remains most common among Japanese firms, B-type is becoming the 
predominant pattern among large Japanese firms (33). Blue chips such as Toyota, Canon, 
Kao, and Yamaha represent this pattern. The best example is Toyota. While external 
governance clearly shifted to market orientation (market financing along with high level of 
foreign shareholding and low cross-shareholding), Toyota’s internal governance stayed 
relational. It has resisted outside directors and strongly maintains long-term employment 
practices coupled with a moderate level of merit-based pay. Some of groups that retain more 
traditional Japanese characteristics, such as the modest use of bank financing and 
predominant practice of seniority-based pay, have made a modest but significant degree of 
governance reforms toward B-type. Examples are Hitachi, NTT DoCoMo, Tokyo Electric 
Power and many large Mitsubishi keiretsu firms (38).  
C-type includes IT or high-tech service firms, retail firms, general trading firms, and 
family owned firms. In general, Japanese service industry prefers more market-oriented 
governance in terms of employment patterns with low levels of long-term employment as 
well as using merit-based pay and stock options (38). But these firms rely on bank financing 
and a modest level of inter-firm relational practices. One deviation from C-type is board 
structure. These groups retain insider board structure (38). Finally, few firms are close to 
convergence. The example of Sony and Orix is closer to D-type.  
Despite powerful forces for change during the past decade, the emergent phenomena are 
far from convergent. While many firms still retain the traditional Japanese model, few are 
large firms that matter most in defining Japan’s future. A significant proportion of large 
firms have significantly shifted from the original model. But shifts are not uniform. Among 
many of Japan’s profitable, mostly manufacturing sectors, external elements of governance 
such as financing and inter-firm relationship patterns have shifted clearly toward more 
market-oriented ones while changes to the internal elements of governance have been partial 
and selective. Mostly in service sectors, internal elements have shifted toward more market-
based sector while changes to the external elements have been slow. In some, both internal 
and external elements are converging to the American model. To put it simply, Japanese 
firms are moving in three ways: from Type-A to Type-B, Type-C and Type-D.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Japan is broadly characterized as ‘coordinated market economies’ where corporate 
ownership, finance, inter-firm relationship, government-business relationship, and labor 
relations all display higher degrees of coordination based on relationship-specific assets and 
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long-term ties. Faced globalization, capital market pressure, and prolonged economic slump, 
Japan has been hard pressed to reform. Given the ascendancy of the American model, there 
were powerful voices advocating reforms for convergence. Despite Americanized policy 
discourses prevalent in Koizumi’s structural reform, we have found that government officials 
and corporate leaders engaged in ‘mixing’ (or ‘hybridizing’) institutions. Institutional change 
occurs in diverse ways: four distinct forms of emergent corporate mechanisms of 
governance; three remain in the CME camp and one closing in LME’s. Second, all of these 
forms coexist within the Japanese political economy. 
Now in 2007, Japan has clearly entered a period of sustained macroeconomic recovery. 
Corporate restructuring has become routine. Firms are less concerned with cash flow 
problems. Banks are more or less free of NPL problems. The conservative rule has been 
reinstated by Koizumi’s remarkable political success. Thus, it is expected that the changes in 
corporate governance are likely to be consolidated. Diversity rules. At this point, several 
implications for Korean capitalism are in order. 
First, in both countries, the dynamic of emulating the American model has driven the 
reform process. Policymakers are always vulnerable to the charge that local practices are out 
of line with global standards (= American standards). Liberal reforms will not be achieved by 
deregulation only. The state must not only dismantle the preexisting regulatory framework, 
but also create and foster the institutions that sustain market competition (Vogel 1996). In 
this sense, for Korea and Japan to move toward the American model, they must dismantle the 
existing institutions and create new ones. Given the institutional complementarities operating 
in a specific capitalist system, this task requires a full conversion at all levels in the system. 
Here, attempts to switching systems are costly (Freeman quoted in Vogel 2006, 211). 
Second, the Japanese experience suggests that policymakers should calculate relative 
benefits and costs of existing institutions when designing reforms. After careful judgment, 
Japanese policymakers crafted a corporate governance reform in the form of corporate law 
by giving freedom to adopt different governance structures, rather than forcing them to do so. 
This approach is plausible because firms are given greater choice and flexibility to 
experiment with what best serves their prosperity. The emergent diversity of institutions is 
the outcome of flexible policy response.  
Finally, in the age of globalization characterized as an open-ended process of rapid, 
unexpected transformation with regards to technology, market and organization, a political 
economy more open to diverse practices and institutions as well as of technologies is 
desirable. Cumulative, sustained, and motivated institutional framework that copes with 
diversity is necessary. Given four diverse and distinct governance forms, this framework 
involves what Jessop calls ‘metagovernance’ or ‘the governance of governance’ (Jessop 
2003, 240). Metagovernance organizes the conditions for diverse governances. Thus it is an 
umbrella concept for redesigning, rearticulating, and steering the coexistence and 
relationship among different modes of governance. It is not the one that imposes a single, all-
purpose mode of governance, nor privileges one over the others. Rather it involves 
sponsoring new organizations, designing institutions to facilitate self-organization in 
different modes, creating linkage/interdependence devices among different governance 
modes, encouraging a relative coherence among diverse objectives, and helps shape the 
context within which these arrangements can be forged (Ibid., 242).  
It is the Japanese state that should play a major role in metagovernance. It should not 
privilege one form over the others. Rather, it should provide ground rules for governance 
through which each mechanism of governance can pursue its respective aim; ensure the 




compatibility or coherence of each governance mechanisms; and act as the primary organizer 
of the dialogue among diverse participants. This is the area where Japan can play the 
‘thought leader’ role in East Asia. Japan has faced governance problems earlier than others, 
and struggled to somehow resolve the problems in within ten years. Japan will gain a soft 
power, something to emulate if it finds a form of metagovernance that is more open to a 
diversity of practices and experiments, better able to combine two contrasting standards of 
efficiency – competition and cooperation – together, able to shape a polity more oriented to 
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